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The Federal Fortress Surrounding Police
Liability For Failure To Enforce Protection
Orders
STEPHANIE SMIERTKA'
INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence is a gender-based problem. 2 Research
suggests that 90 to 95 percent of domestic violence victims
are women. 3 In the wake of the recognition of this epidemic
of violence against women, the advent of the civil protection
order has been a successful tool for women seeking to stop
violence. 4 Civil protection orders, however, are ineffective
when police fail to enforce them, which results in the
serious bodily injury or death of many women and their
children.5 There is a national problem of police failure to
enforce restraining orders.6 National studies estimate that

1 Stephanie Smiertka is a State of Delaware Judicial Law Clerk; J.D (2012),
the George Washington Law School; B.A. (2009), the University of Maryland,
College Park. I would like to thank Clinical Professor of Law at the George
Washington Law School, Joan Meier, for being a mentor and helping to expand
my ideas for this paper. I would also like to thank my family for all of their
support.
2
See Kersti A. Yllo & Murray A. Straus, Patriarchyand Violence against
Wives: The Impact of Structuraland Normative Factors,in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE
IN AMERICAN FAMILIES, 383, 384 (Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles eds.,
1995).
3
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Violence Between Intimates, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 2 (Nov. 1994), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vbi.pdf.
4
SUSAN L. KEILITZ ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS RESEARCH
PROJECT, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER: THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS FOR
VICTIMS
OF
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
35
(1997),
available at

http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpoll257.
5
Atinuke 0. Awoyomi, The State-Created Danger Doctrine in Domestic
Violence Cases: Do We Have a Solution in Okin v. Village of Cornwall-onHudson Police Department?20 COLUM. J. GENDER &L. 1, 2 (2011).
6
Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current
Court Practice, and Enforcement, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY
VIOLENCE, 43, 43 (1998).
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60 percent of restraining orders are violated within the first
year of being issued, with 29 percent of those violations
being violent.7
The overwhelming majority of people
affected by non-enforcement of restraining orders are
women who have been historically discriminated against in
all areas of law and society.8 Frequently, discrimination
and common gender-stereotypes about women fuel police
decisions not to enforce protective orders.9 Federal courts,
however, have failed to provide victims of police nonenforcement with appropriate civil remedies, resulting in
injustice for victims.' 0
This paper argues that the United States Supreme Court
is responsible for creating and condoning an atmosphere of
police unaccountability in the legal system for victims of
domestic violence through their decisions in Town of Castle

Rock v. Gonzales" and DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services.12 These decisions have
placed the onus on the states to solve the problem of police
non-enforcement, while simultaneously depriving them of
the tools to succeed.13 By foreclosing the use of the Due
Process Clause to hold police forces accountable, the

7 Niji Jain, comment, Engendering Fairness in Domestic Violence Arrests:
Improving Police Accountability Through the EqualProtectionClause, 60 EMORY
L.J. 1011, 1016 (2011).
8
See generally Erica Franklin, When Domestic Violence and Sex-based
DiscriminationCollide: Civil Rights Approaches to CombatingDomestic Violence
and its Aftermath, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR Soc. JUST. 335, 350-51 (2011) (Men often use
domestic violence as a means of exerting power and control to keep women
subordinate in society. Domestic violence victims also suffer collateral
consequences such as discrimination in employment, housing, and protection
from law enforcement).
9

See Jain, supranote 7.

10

See id. at 1011.

Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
13
In order to strengthen police response to restraining order violations, many
states have enacted mandatory civil protection enforcement statutes, and in
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the United States Supreme Court effectively stated
that mandatory enforcement statutes are not really mandatory. See Castle Rock,
11

12

545 U.S. at 748.
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Supreme Court deprives domestic violence victims of the
best constitutional avenue to vindicate their rights. 14
The only viable federal constitutional claim for victims is
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, which has
largely proven to be unsuccessful in granting a remedy to
domestic violence victims due to the nearly insurmountable
pleading standards of a disparate impact claim. 15
Nevertheless, since the Equal Protection Clause is the only
viable federal claim, crafting methods to strengthen an
equal protection claim in order to survive motions for
summary judgment and dismissal is imperative to secure
settlements for victims of non-enforcement.
The statecreated danger doctrine has also proven to be an ineffective
remedy for victims of non-enforcement because it requires
proof that the police increased danger to the victim.16 Due
to a series of Supreme Court holdings, many trial courts
refuse to characterize police failure to enforce restraining
orders as increasing danger because the courts do not find
that police failure to enforce equates to an affirmative
action required under the state-created danger doctrine.17
Considering the ineffectiveness of the Equal Protection
Clause and the state-created danger doctrine, in order to
provide victims of police non-enforcement with a viable legal
claim, the decision in CastleRock must be overturned. Civil
protection orders must be considered a property right when

See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 748 (holding that a mandatory enforcement
provision for a civil protection order does not create a property interest entitled
to protection under the procedural Due Process Clause); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
189 (holding that there is no affirmative right of police protection from private
violence under the substantive Due Process Clause).
15 See infra Part I, Section C & Part II.
16
Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The State-CreatedDanger Doctrine,
13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1165, 1167-68 (2005).
17
See id. at 1194-1200 (Oren discusses the "deliberate indifference standard"
which illustrates the situation where police recklessly disregard a domestic
violence situation as commonplace and choose not to respond with appropriate
force. Routinely, law enforcement has been found not liable under current law
that refuses to find deliberate indifference enough for a due process violation).
14
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state legislatures decide to mandate their enforcement and
provide entitlement to police protection.' 8
This paper discusses federal remedies for the deprivation
of the constitutional rights of domestic violence victims for
non-enforcement of restraining orders. Part I discusses the
current jurisprudence of three constitutional claims: Section
A discusses the evisceration of a substantive due process
claim, Section B discusses the foreclosure of a procedural
due process claim, and Section C summarizes the difficulty
of succeeding with an equal protection claim under the
current standard for non-enforcement victims.
The
Supreme Court has never heard an equal protection case
brought by a domestic violence victim against the police for
lack of enforcement.
Under the high burden of proof
currently required by the majority of Federal Circuits,
however, an equal protection claim is unlikely to succeed.
Part II focuses on methods to achieve a successful
gender-based equal protection claim. Surviving summary
judgment or motions to dismiss can be instrumental in
prompting settlement or winning a verdict at trial. When
plaintiffs advance a disparate impact argument, the focus
must be on gathering evidence of a discriminatory police
policy against domestic violence victims during the early
stages of litigation. A plaintiff must also argue that the
historical background of domestic violence is probative of
discrimination against women in police non-enforcement of
protection orders.
Another method to succeed, even if improbable, is with a
gender-based equal protection claim so a plaintiff can avoid
a disparate impact argument, and obtain intermediate
scrutiny by showing that the failure to enforce restraining
orders is gender-stereotyping on an individual basis.19 This
18
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) (noting that property interests are
"not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understanding that stem from an independent
source such as state law...") (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
19 Jain, supra note 7, at 1034.
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claim, however, is unlikely to succeed because of the
difficulty in marshalling proof of gender-stereotyping due to
the subjective discretion of police officers.
Part III discusses the current use of the state-created
danger doctrine against police departments for nonenforcement of restraining orders. The state-created danger
doctrine is an exception to DeShaney's rule that there is no
right to state protection from private violence. 20 The
doctrine allows individuals to hold state actors accountable
if they increased the danger to the individual under the
color of state law. 2 1 However, under the state-created
danger doctrine, it is difficult to hold the police or other
state actors accountable for a failure to act. 22 Most cases
require an affirmative action by law enforcement that
created danger to the victim of domestic violence. 23
Unfortunately, the majority of Federal Circuits, however, do
not consider failure to enforce a restraining order to be a
type of affirmative action. 24 Additionally, the national
inconsistency of the application of the doctrine is
problematic for victims because the law varies with each
Circuit, and the Supreme Court has not recognized the
state-created danger doctrine. 26
Part IV discusses why the Supreme Court's decision in
Castle Rock is legally erroneous and why the decision
should be reversed. In Castle Rock, Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, held that civil protection orders do not
create a property interest, even with language of mandatory
enforcement created by state legislatures. 26 This holding
insulates police from civil accountability for gross
misconduct that results in the deaths of many women and
20

Awoyomi, supranote 5, at 3.

21

Id.
Id. at 4.

22

23

Id.
Id. at 12-13.
25
Id. at 3.
26 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005) (Mandatory civil
protection order enforcement statutes do not create a property interest).
24
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children. This paper argues that reversal of the Castle Rock
decision is the best avenue for securing a remedy for police
non-enforcement because it allows the states to determine
that their police force should be accountable through
language created by each state legislature. This would
equalize the burden of solving the non-enforcement problem
between the federal and state system. A reversal of the
decision would also put the responsibility on the state
legislatures to enact mandatory enforcement statutes that
create a property interest, and then place the duty on
federal courts to ensure that victims receive procedural due
process. The decision should be reversed, notwithstanding
stare decisis, because it is not well reasoned and experience
For
has shown the shortcomings of the precedent. 27
example, the international community declared that the
United States is in violation of human rights regarding its
systematic failure to address the epidemic of domestic
violence. 28 The Supreme Court needs to take a stand
against police non-enforcement and allow victims a
meaningful constitutional remedy by reversing Castle Rock.
PART I. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, plaintiffs can bring civil
actions against individuals for violation of their
constitutional rights if the defendant was acting under the
color of state law and violated the plaintiffs rights under
the Constitution. 29 Claims against police officers and state
actors for violation of domestic violence victims'
constitutional rights, however, have been eviscerated by the
United States Supreme Court over the years.

See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 80/11, 160 (July 21, 2011).
29
Civil action for deprivation of rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
27

28
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Eviscerationof a Substantive Due Process Claim

A domestic violence victim is effectively barred from
bringing a successful claim for violation of substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In DeShaney v.

Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the
Supreme Court held that "a State's failure to protect an
individual against private violence simply does not
constitute a violation under the Due Process Clause."30
Catherine MacKinnon and other feminist scholars recognize
that this negative conception of rights in the United States
fails to provide women with the tools they need to live freely
and equally to men in modern society. 3 1 Lower courts have
created the state-created danger doctrine, which derived
from dicta in DeShaney.32
After the rejection of an
affirmative right to police protection, the Supreme Court
decided whether a valid order of protection constituted a
property interest.33

B.

Eviscerationof the ProceduralDue Process Claim

In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court
rejected Jessica Lenahan's claim that she had a property
interest in the enforcement of a restraining order against
her ex-husband, who kidnapped and murdered her three
daughters after she pleaded for police intervention more
than eight times. 34 If Jessica Lenahan had "known the
police would not do anything to locate her daughters, she

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197
(1989).
30
31

CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 164-65

(1989).
32

See infra Part III.

33

Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).

Id. at 768; Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R.,
30-31, Report No. 80/11 (Jessica Lenahan's former last name
has been changed from Gonzales).
34
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would have undertaken steps to find them herself and avoid
the tragedy."35
In Justice Scalia's majority opinion, he erased the
strength of mandatory enforcement statutes by stating that
"[a] well established tradition of police discretion has long
coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes." 36
This opinion effectively forecloses any successful procedural
due process claim against the police for violation of victims'
due process. The repercussions of the Castle Rock opinion
are devastating to victims because it prohibits state
legislatures from creating an entitlement or property
interest in enforcement by making police response to
protection orders mandatory. Justice Scalia further stated
that "[e]ven if the statute could be said to have made
enforcement of restraining orders 'mandatory' because of
the domestic-violence context of the underlying statute, that
would not necessarily mean that state law gave respondent
an entitlement to enforcement of the mandate."37 This
language suggests that whatever protections the state
legislatures enact, there will be no federal remedy when the
state actors responsible for enforcing these protections fail
to execute the statute. This generates a great divide
between the federal and state systems on the enforcement
of protection orders because it creates a national
atmosphere of unaccountability in the trial courts. For
these reasons, Castle Rock must be overturned. 38

C. The High Hurdles of the Gender-Based
Equal ProtectionClaim
1. Equal Protection Claims in General
The only viable federal claim for women seeking to hold
the police liable for failure to enforce restraining orders is
35

Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,

1 32, Report No. 80/11.
36
3
38

CastleRock, 545 U.S. at 760 (emphasis added).
Id. at 764-65.
See infra Part IV.
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under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which states that "[n]o state shall .. . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." 39 The majority in DeShaney noted that a "[s]tate
may not, of course, selectively deny its protective services to
certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal
Protection Clause."40 However, the Supreme Court has not
heard an equal protection claim against the police for nonenforcement of a civil protection order.
Courts review equal protection claims on three tiers,
based on the classification used to distinguish similarly
situated persons. 4 1 The first level of review is strict
scrutiny, which is invoked when a classification is based on
race or national origin of a person, and requires the State to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest that is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 4 2 The next level
of review is intermediate scrutiny, where the state must
advance an important government interest that is
substantially related to achieving that interest; gender
classifications receive intermediate review. 43 The final level
of review is rational basis, where the government only has
to show a legitimate interest and that the classification of a
person is reasonably related to achieving that interest.44
Intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications that are
overtly based on gender. 45 When a classification is neutral
on its face, intermediate scrutiny can still be obtained by

U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3
(1989).
39

40

41

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICES 669-70,

676 (2006).
42

43

Id. at 671.
Id.; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 41, at 672. Because the rational basis review is
highly deferential to the government, this paper will focus only on a genderbased equal protection claim which rise to the level of intermediate scrutiny.
44

45

Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.

96

BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAWAND SOCIAL POLICY

Vol. XXI

arguing that there is a disparate impact on one gender. 46
The United States Supreme Court analyzed whether a
gender neutral statute had a disparate impact on women, in
Personnel Administratorof Massachusetts v. Feeney, where
it upheld a Massachusetts statute that gave preference to
veterans for state civil service positions. 47 The majority of
veterans were male (98 percent), but the Court rejected the
argument that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it operated to exclude women from
consideration for civil service jobs. 48 The Equal Protection
Clause guarantees "equal laws, not equal results."49 The
Court reasoned that in order to prove disparate impact, the
classification had to be neutral and the adverse effect has to
reflect invidious discrimination.5 0 "Discriminatory intent is
a factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it is
not" and the policy must be adopted "because of' not "in
spite of' the adverse impact on women.5 1 The Court found
that there was no purposeful discrimination by the
Massachusetts legislature against women when they
enacted the law. 52 Justice Marshall, in dissent, recognized
the role of gender-stereotyping that may have been present
in the legislature's decision as a by-product of the history of
discrimination against women.5 3 He emphasized that the
preference is an "almost exclusively male prerogative" and
that "[s]uch a statutory scheme both reflects and
perpetuates precisely the kind of archaic assumptions about
women's roles which we have previously held invalid."54

46

See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979) (citing

Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
4
Id. at 277.
48

Id. at 270.

49

Id. at 273.

50
51

Id. at 274.
Id. at 279.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 283-285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

54

Id.
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The Supreme Court's reasoning in Feeney has been
applied by the Circuit Courts in cases where a victim seeks
to hold police accountable for non-enforcement of
restraining orders.55
Feeney's reasoning creates a
significant
hurdle
for
victims
because
proving
discriminatory intent behind a police policy is extremely
difficult.
As will be discussed, federal courts have
interpreted discriminatory intent behind police policies as
having to be overt and systematic in nature.
2. Discriminatory Policy and Discriminatory Purpose as
Applied By Federal Circuits
While there was early success for equal protection claims
against police in the context of restraining orders found in
Watson v. City of Kansas City,5 6 it has been eroded by a
series of Circuit Court opinions which have narrowly
interpreted the manner of proving a discriminatory policy
and intent. For example, in Watson v. City of Kansas City,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of defendants because the
Tenth Circuit determined that police officers could have
violated the plaintiffs right to equal protection because
there was sufficient evidence of police treating victims of
domestic violence differently than victims of other crimes.57
Ms. Watson was able to present extensive evidence about
police officer training and statistics that showed that
domestic violence crimes were treated systematically
differently than other similar crimes.5 8 However, the Tenth
Circuit rejected her claim that the disparity in police
response to victims of domestic violence was gender
See generally, Hynson v. Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir.
1988) (holding there was no proof of discriminatory intent by the police in police
response to domestic violence).
56
See Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
55

57

See id. at 696.

Id. at 695 (Plaintiff presented evidence showing that the arrest rate for nondomestic assault with a known perpetrator was thirty one percent while the
arrest rate for domestic assaults was only sixteen percent).
58
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discrimination, stating that disparate impact on women
alone is not enough. 59 In Thurman v. City of Torrington,
the plaintiff was successful in her equal protection claim
because she was able to demonstrate that the city
systematically provided domestic violence victims with less
protection over an eight month period, which proved a
discriminatory purpose and policy. 6 0 Subsequent Circuit
Court holdings erected a high barrier for plaintiffs claiming
gender-based equal protection claims against the police.
For example, in Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal
Department, the Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs
argument that police officers had a policy of ignoring
domestic abuse complaints when her former boyfriend
violated restraining orders and killed her at work. 6 ' This
case is important because it set forth a three factor test a
plaintiff must satisfy for a successful gender-based equal
protection claim. 62 This test, or a similar one, has been
adopted by five other circuits around the country. 63 The
three factors a plaintiff must prove are: (1) sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the
police had a policy or custom to provide less protection to
domestic violence victims versus victims of other violent
crimes; (2) there was a discriminatory purpose behind the
policy; 6 4 and (3) that the plaintiff was injured by this
policy 65

59

See id. at 695-97.

Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1530 (D. Conn. 1984).
61
Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1027, 1031 (3d Cir.
1988).
62
Id. at 1031.
63
Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1066 (1st Cir. 1997); Navarro v. Block, 72
F.3d 712, 714-17 (9th Cir. 1995); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir.
1994); Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1994); McKee v.
City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1989).
64
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276-79 (1979).
65
Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031.
60
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a. Difficulty of Proving Hvnson Factor One:
Discriminatory Policy
A plaintiff must show sufficient evidence of a police
policy that provides less protection to victims of domestic
violence.66 This requirement is nearly impossible for the
average litigant to prove for many reasons. For example,
information is deficient because many police departments
do not keep statistical information readily available of the
amount of response rates to domestic violence calls versus
other crimes. The only litigants who have the ability to
acquire this information are individuals who have
significant financial resources to conduct the type of legal
and quasi-detective work that this factor requires. Without
concrete statistics and specific proof of discrimination,
courts are unlikely to find a police policy towards domestic
violence is discriminatory towards women.
Circuit courts interpret what constitutes evidence of a
discriminatory policy narrowly. For example, in Burella v.
City of Philadelphia the Third Circuit rejected what
appeared to be at least probative evidence of a
discriminatory policy. 6 7 The plaintiff provided the court
with a police sergeant's statements that the victims of
domestic violence are primarily female and an expert report
showing that the Philadelphia Police Department engaged
in systematic discrimination against female domestic
The court stated that although
violence victims. 6 8
"statistical evidence and individual arrest records are not
per se requirements in this context, such evidence may
often be crucial." 69 The rejection of Ms. Burella's evidence of
a discriminatory policy at the pleading stage illustrates the
high value placed on actual numerical data. Statistical data
of "differential response to women affected by domestic

66
67
68
69

Id.
See Burella v. Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 137-38, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 149.
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violence is a necessary prerequisite to succeeding on an
equal protection claim on the basis of gender."70
The narrow construction of what demonstrates a
discriminatory policy provides the police with insulation
against liability. In a concurring opinion in Burella, Judge
Ambro asserts that "[s]tate protection-from-abuse statutes
seem to reside in a rock-solid castle of narrow construction
barring any federal constitutional relief for the very victims
that the statutes are designed to protect."71 The majority
also seemed troubled by the result by noting that the facts
(if taken as true) reveal a "terrible deficiency on the part of
the Philadelphia Police Department in responding to her
The difficulty of
complaints of domestic abuse." 72
statistically proving a discriminatory policy between
responding to domestic violence and other crimes usually
precludes the plaintiffs ability to successfully advance a
If, however, the
gender-based equal protection claim.
resources and
the
have
to
enough
is
fortunate
plaintiff
statistical evidence of a discriminatory policy available to
her, then she will have to prove the more difficult factor of
discriminatory intent.
b. Difficulty of Proving Hvnson Factor Two:
Discriminatory Intent
Proving discriminatory purpose against women is
difficult in a police policy that discriminates between
victims of domestic violence and other crimes under the
current Hynson standard. This standard was adopted from
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, where
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff has to show that a
gender-neutral law or policy was adopted to purposefully
Therefore, a plaintiff
discriminate against women. 73
claiming a gender-based violation of equal protection must

72

Jain, supra note 7, at 1031.
Burella,501 F.3d at 150 (Ambro, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added).
Id. at 149.

1

Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).

70

71
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prove that police officers did not enforce her restraining
order because "they had a policy to provide women-not just
domestic violence victims-with an inferior standard of
protection." 74
The majority of Circuits refuse to infer discriminatory
purpose from the treatment of the individual plaintiff. In

Okin v. Village of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Department,
the Second Circuit rejected the argument that it was the
police department's unwritten policy to treat domestic
violence complaints differently because they were women. 75
The court found that while there was evidence of police
failure to protect Michele Okin individually; this was not
sufficient proof of a department wide policy. 7 6 The court
noted that Okin "could have attempted to show that she and
other women were discriminated against," but she failed to
do so and therefore could not prove discriminatory intent.77
Evidence of discriminatory purpose against women is
highly unlikely to be uncovered, given the nature of police
departments and policies today. Formal statements of a
department policy to discriminate against women are rare
because the discrimination usually occurs on the basis of a
police officer's subjective beliefs and decisions. Catherine
MacKinnon stated in a debate on the invalidated civil
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act, "[t]he
definition of intent .

.

. under the Fourteenth Amendment

has made the Fourteenth Amendment nearly worthless to
women. That is, if you don't think bad thoughts about
women while doing bad things to them, it doesn't violate the
Equal Protection Clause."78 Due to the inability for victims
to survive past the pleading stage of many equal protection
claims, new approaches to gathering evidence could produce
Jain, supra note 7, at 1032.
Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 438 (2d Cir.
2009).
76 Id. at 438-39.
74

75

77

Id. at 439.

Charles Fried & Catherine MacKinnon, Arguing the Violence Against
Women Act: Two Views, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOc'Y AT HARVARD LAW
SCH. (May 1, 2000), http://cyber.law.harvard.edularchivedcon-tent/events/vaw/.
78
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better results for victims and prompt settlement of the
claims.
PART II. SOLUTIONS TO STRENGTHEN EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAIMS

Because an equal protection claim is the only federal
remedy currently available, surviving motions for summary
judgment and for dismissal are necessary to facilitate
settlement or win verdicts, thereby obtaining justice for the
victims of police non-enforcement.
A. Focusingon CollectingEnough Evidence of
DiscriminatoryPolicy
In light of the great weight given to statistical data to
prove a discriminatory policy, it is imperative for plaintiffs
to attempt to collect this data early in litigation. It is
important for the victim to document not only the instances
of non-response in her case, but also instances of nonresponse department-wide.
Drawing analogies to reports that have found
discriminatory policies can be useful in collecting evidence.
The U.S. Department of Justice recently released a report
finding that the New Orleans Police Department engaged in
gender-biased policing and had inadequate domestic
violence training and investigation procedures. 79 The report
found that the Domestic Violence Unit staff of three
detectives was inadequate for the volume of domestic calls.8 0
There was also evidence of inadequate investigations
because of failure to find and interview witnesses. 8 1 The
Department of Justice also released a report finding that
the Puerto Rico Police Department "fails to police sex crimes

ClVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF NEW ORLEANS
79
available at http://www.justice.gov/POLICE DEPARTMENT 49-51 (2011),
crt/about/spl/nopd_report.pdf.
so Id. at 50.
81

Id. at 50-51.
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and incidents of domestic violence." 82 These reports can
give a plaintiff an idea of certain discrepancies to look for
within her own police department for evidence collection.
The plaintiff can also file a complaint against the police
department with the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, who might open an investigation into the
department.83 The nature and content of these reports are
likely to be considered strong evidence of department-wide
discriminatory police policies.
B. HistoricalContext of Domestic Violence is Probativeof
DiscriminatoryIntent
Although the discriminatory intent standard is difficult
to satisfy, it is possible to prove it in the context of the
history of domestic violence and police relations.
In
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation,the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he historical
background of the decision is one evidentiary source [of
discriminatory intent], particularly if it reveals a series of
official actions undertaken for invidious purposes." 84
Extreme disparate impact may be sufficient to establish
equal protection violations in the absence of discriminatory
intent.85
A plaintiff should argue that domestic violence is a
product of historical discrimination against women, which
influenced the series of official actions when the police
The
decided not to enforce her restraining order.
overwhelming majority of domestic violence victims are
women, 90 to 95 percent, which qualifies as extreme
disparate impact when police refuse to enforce protection

82

CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF PUERTO Rico
DEPARTMENT
2
(2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/-

POLICE

crt/about/spl/documents/prpd-exec-summ.pdf.
88 Information on how to file a complaint with the Department of Justice can
be found at http://www.justice.gov/crt/complaint/.
84
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
85
See id. at 266.
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orders.86 The extreme disparate impact on women in the
non-enforcement of protection orders could be sufficient to
establish discriminatory intent alone.8 7 Historically, wifebeating was seen as a "private matter" not acceptable to
discuss in the "public sphere." 88 The prevalence of police
non-intervention in domestic violence derives from the long
history of ignoring violence against women in the setting of
public regulation.89
While the historical practices of
coverture and chastisement are no longer sanctioned by
law, the differential treatment of partner violence and
stranger violence still perpetuate invidious female
stereotypes and subjugation within relationships. 90
Plaintiffs should argue that the Feeney standard for
purposeful discrimination has been applied too rigidly in
non-enforcement
cases
because
Federal
Circuit
jurisprudence fails to take into account the historical
discrimination from which domestic violence derives. The
majority in Feeney found "nothing in the record . .. that this
preference for veterans was originally devised . .. because it

would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a
stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil
Service."9 1 Each time that a police officer refuses to enforce
a restraining order because a woman is married or involved
with the man, it reinforces the stereotypic notions that
domestic violence is a private matter, subjugating a woman
to the confines of the home and her husband. 92 An
important factor in the Feeney majority's finding of no
discriminatory intent by the legislature is that a significant
Franklin, supra note 8, at 338.
Cf. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (implying an extreme impact could be
evidence of discriminatory purpose).
86

87
88

See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the

Futureof Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1657, 1661-62 (2004).
89
See Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the
ConstitutionHelp them when the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 792 (1986).
90
See Franklin, supranote 8, at 350-51.
91
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
92
See Jain, supra note 7, at 1039-40.
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number of non-veterans disadvantaged by the preference for
veterans were men. 93
In the context of police nonenforcement, there are not a significant number of men who
are directly disadvantaged by refusal to enforce restraining
orders.
Women are consistently the victims when
restraining orders are not enforced.
The
Feeney
majority
acknowledged
that
the
foreseeability of consequences of a gender-neutral policy
could also be probative of discriminatory intent, "[w]hen the
adverse consequences of a law upon an identifiable group
are [ inevitable . . . a strong inference that the adverse

effects were desired can reasonably be drawn."9 4 The effect
of non-enforcement of protective orders inevitably harm
women, and it can be reasonably drawn that the police
intended to discriminate against women by failing to
enforce protective orders because of historical notions
"grounded in antiquated stereotypes as to women's roles in
intimate relationships and society."95 The ability of the
plaintiff to demonstrate that discriminatory intent against
women in non-enforcement is intertwined with the
historical discrimination of women and domestic violence
could help expand the Feeney standard of discriminatory
intent within domestic violence non-enforcement cases.
C. Gender-Stereotype Framework
Niji Jain developed a framework for a gender-based
equal protection argument that invokes intermediate
scrutiny through a victim's claim that the individual police
officer used gender-stereotypes when deciding not to
respond to a victim. 96
While this is an innovative
reformulation of the equal protection claim, it is unlikely to
prevail. There are two flaws in the application of the
gender-stereotype approach to non-enforcement equal
9
9
9
96

See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
Id. at 279 n.25.
Franklin, supranote 8, at 350-51.
Jai, supra note 7, at 1034.
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protection claims: (1) lack of an explicit discrimination
policy, and (2) the deferential treatment of police discretion.
The cases that have found constitutionally impermissible
gender-stereotyping were based on explicit policies
excluding one gender based on "archaic and overbroad
For example, in both Mississippi
generalizations." 97

University for Women v. Hogan and United States v.
Virginia, state universities had explicit policies of denying
admission to one gender based on notions that the denied
gender could not perform the functions of the other.98 Even
if the plaintiff can prove gender-stereotyping by the police
officer through statements, the absence of an explicit
discriminatory policy that is based on that stereotype will
distinguish a non-enforcement case from the line of
Supreme Court cases holding that gender-stereotypes are
impermissible.
An equal protection claim based on non-enforcement due
to the officer's use of stereotypes of women as frantic or
inferior to men is only possible if there are smoking gun
comments. Without specific comments, the plaintiff is
unlikely to prove gender discrimination because it is
difficult to capture each subjective thought that influences
an officer's decision to not respond to a domestic violence
complaint. Also, there is a high probability that a police
officer will be able to explain his decision on the basis of
police discretion, which is given great deference. 99 An equal
protection argument based on gender stereotypes seems to
face the same difficult task of collecting evidence of a

See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (quoting
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).

9

See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (finding a policy
discriminatory that explicitly prohibited admitting men based on genderstereotype that men could not be nurses); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996) (invalidating a policy of not admitting women based on the
stereotype that they would not like the aggressive teaching methods).
See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005) ("A well9
9

established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently
mandatory arrest statutes.").
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discriminatory policy and intent that is necessary for a
disparate treatment argument.

D. Conclusionabout Equal ProtectionClaims
Plaintiffs attempting to bring gender-based equal
protection claims for non-enforcement of protective orders
face arduous burdens of proof. In a disparate impact
argument, focusing on methods to prove discriminatory
policy and purpose are crucial to the success of the claim.
However, by accumulating statistical evidence, a plaintiff
may establish that the police have an impermissible
discriminatory policy. Then, using the historical context of
violence against women, combined with police actions, may
be enough to prove discriminatory intent against women in
a policy of non-enforcement.
Impermissible genderstereotype equal protection claims, while sounding good in
theory, have the practical problems of unavailability of
proof and a lack of an explicit policy of discrimination
present in the line of Supreme Court cases holding genderstereotypes impermissible.100 Although an equal protection
claim is unlikely to succeed, future success may turn on the
ability to get courts to recognize the inextricable link
between police non-enforcement
and the historical
discrimination against women in the domestic violence
context.
PART III. INADEQUACY OF THE STATE-CREATED DANGER
DOCTRINE

A. The State-CreatedDangerDoctrine
The state-created danger doctrine evolved in trial courts
as a response to mitigate the harshness of the Supreme
Court's holding in DeShaney, which held that a state has no
affirmative duty under the Due Process Clause to protect

See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
100
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individuals from private violence.101 The state-created
danger doctrine exception allows a domestic violence victim
to claim a due process violation if the police caused or
increased the danger to a victim.10 2 Multi-factor tests vary
with individual circuits, but common factors include: (1)
that the harm was foreseeable and direct; (2) the
defendant's conduct put the victim at substantial risk of
serious and immediate harm; and (3) the police made
affirmative action (not necessarily inaction) to increase or
cause danger to the victim.10 3 Due to these rigorous factors,
domestic violence victims "almost always fail to prove one of
the prongs of the requisite tests."104

B. Problems with the Doctrinein the Domestic Violence
Context
The state-created danger doctrine is an ineffective
remedy for victims of police non-enforcement of restraining
orders because most courts refuse to characterize police
inaction as increasing the danger to the victim. 0 5
Therefore, police failure to enforce restraining orders must
be characterized as an affirmative action in order to protect
victims of domestic violence under the state-created danger
doctrine. However, the Second Circuit "treats repeated
inaction in the face of violence as affirmative condoning of
violence, even if done implicitly." 0 6 The Second Circuit's
willingness to characterize police inaction as an affirmative
action has potential, but it has yet to generate any

101 See Awoyomi, supra note 5, at 3.
See Susanne M. Browne, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to
the Inadequate response of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations,68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1295, 1303 (1995).
103 Awoyomi, supranote 5, at 3-4.
104 Id. at 4.
105 Id.; see supraPart I.
106 Awoyomi, supranote 5, at 36.
102
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substantial progress for victims of domestic violence in
other jurisdictions.10 7
1. Refusal to Find Failure to Act as Affirmative Action
Rather Than Omission
The majority of federal courts refuse to find police
inaction as an affirmative act, which limits the effectiveness
of the state-created danger doctrine in the domestic violence
context because when the police fail to enforce a restraining
order, they affirmatively increase the danger to victims but
are not held legally accountable. Justice Brennan's dissent
in DeShaney highlights the majority's problematic
rationale. 108
There, Justice Brennan stated "[m]y
disagreement with the Court arises from its failure to see
that inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as action,
that oppression can result when a State undertakes a vital
duty and ignores it."109
The majority's refusal to
characterize the failure to act as an affirmative action
transmitted to the lower courts when they began to carve
out the exception to DeShaney.11 o
In Pinder v. Johnson, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
victim's claim that police assurances that the abuser would
be incarcerated overnight and failing to charge him with a
serious crime were affirmative acts rather than
omissions.11 1 They refused to find affirmative conduct
because if the court so held, then "every representation by

107 See Mayrides v. Delaware Cnty Comm'r, 666 F. Supp. 2d 861 (S.D. Ohio
2009) (declining to extend the Okin approach); Estate of Jennifer Vorderman v.
City of Edgerton, No. 09-CV-443-WMC, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 3788669, at *10
(W.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2010) ("officers' decision not to take the abuser's gun
constitutes inaction and cannot form a basis for finding that the officers
increased or created the danger Jennifer faced.").
108 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).

109

Id.

110

See Awoyomi, supranote 5, at 3.
Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995).
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the police and every failure to incarcerate would constitute
'affirmative actions', giving rise to civil liability." 112
Ms. Pinder did everything possible to protect both her
life and the lives of her now deceased three children, but
tragically the police did not.113 Her estranged boyfriend
broke into her house, brutally assaulted her, and threatened
to kill her and her children.114 A neighbor restrained him
until the police arrived, and then Officer Johnson placed the
Afterwards, Ms. Pinder notified
man under arrest."15
Officer Johnson that the man had previously threatened her
numerous times and that he was just released from prison
for being convicted of attempted arson of her home ten
months ago.1 6 She asked Officer Johnson whether it would
be safe for her to return to work, and he assured her that
the perpetrator would be incarcerated overnight and that
she would have to wait until the next morning to swear out
a warrant against him.117 After these reassurances, Ms.
Pinder returned to work that night, leaving her children at
home." 8
That evening, Officer Johnson charged the abuser with
two misdemeanors-trespassing and malicious destruction
of property-and he was subsequently released with a
warning to stay away from Ms. Pinder's home.119 However,
soon after his release, the man returned to Ms. Pinder's
house and set the house on fire, killing her three sleeping
children.120 While the criminal justice system ultimately
held the perpetrator accountable for his actions, the civil
system did not hold the police accountable for their false

112

Id.

113

115

Id.
Id. at 1172.
Id.

116

Id.

117
118

Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1172.

119

Id.

120

Id.
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assurances and poor decisions.121 The distinction between
affirmative acts and omissions insulate state actors from
accountability, even when their gross miscalculations result
in the deaths of innocent women and children.
2. Second Circuit Approach in Okin Has Not Generated
National Change
The Second Circuit's recent approach to characterizing
repeated police inaction as affirmative action has not taken
In Okin v. Village of
hold in other jurisdictions. 122
Cornwall-on-HudsonPolice Department,the Second Circuit
recently found that "repeated sustained inaction . . . in the
face of potential violence . . . [may rise] to the level of

affirmative condoning of private violence, even if there is
not explicit approval or encouragement." 12 3 Okin's novel
approach recognizes that domestic violence is a unique
context. However, the Okin approach only protects victims
who are repeatedly ignored over time by the police; it fails
to provide protection for victims whose restraining order is
not enforced once. It only takes one time for a violation of a
restraining order to result in a tragedy.
While the state-created danger doctrine is a useful tool
for litigants against the police, the claims rarely succeed. 124
The doctrine is a poor fit in the domestic violence context
because of the hesitation of the majority of courts in this
country to find that police inaction equates to an affirmative
act. 125
Id. He was convicted of first degree murder and is serving three life
sentences.
122 See, e.g., Mayrides v. Delaware Cnty. Comm'r, 666 F. Supp. 2d 861, 868
(S.D. Ohio 2009) (declining to extend the approach taken in Okin); Cf. Estate of
Jennifer Vorderman v. Edgerton, No. 09-CV-443-WMC, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL
3788669, at *10 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2010) ("officers' decision not to take the
abuser's gun constitutes inaction and cannot form a basis for finding that the
officers increased or created the danger Jennifer faced.").
123 Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 428 (2d Cir.
2009).
124 See Awoyomi, supranote 5, at 4.
125 Id. at 38-40.
121
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IV. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF POLICE NONENFORCEMENT

A. Importanceof FederalRecognition of Constitutional
Right to Mandatory Enforcement
1. Balancing Federal and State Responsibilities
The Supreme Court's decisions in DeShaney and Castle
Rock are responsible for creating and condoning an
atmosphere of police unaccountability in the legal system
with regard to non-enforcement of restraining orders.126
The Supreme Court's decisions have set the national tone of
judicial unwillingness in the lower courts to hold the police
accountable for their mistakes. 127
In order for civil
protection orders to be more than a piece of paper that
purports to give mandatory police protection, the Supreme
Court must recognize that state legislatures are able to
create property rights for women seeking protective orders.
Recognizing mandatory enforcement of civil protection
orders as a property interest will balance federal and state
interests in eradicating police non-enforcement of
restraining orders by equalizing the burden. A reversal of
the Castle Rock decision would put the responsibility on the
state legislatures to create mandatory enforcement
language that creates a property interest, and then place
the duty on federal and state courts to ensure that victims
are entitled to procedural due process.
2. Castle Rock Violates International Human Rights
The international community agrees that the United
States must address their inadequate response to the
domestic violence epidemic.128
The Inter-American
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989);
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
127 See supraPart I, Sections A-B.
128 See Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Report No. 80/11.
126

2013

FAILURE TO ENFORCE PROTECTION ORDERS

113

Commission on Human Rights declared that the United
States violated human rights in the Castle Rock case.129
"[E]ven though the State recognized the necessity to protect
Jessica Lenahan and Leslie, Katheryn and Rebecca
Gonzales from domestic violence, it failed to meet this duty
with due diligence. The state apparatus was not duly
organized, coordinated and ready to protect these victims
from domestic violence.
"130 The Commission held that
the failure of "adequately and effectively implementing the
restraining order at issue" was a "form of discrimination"
that violates Article II of the American Declaration.131
United States citizens should be frustrated that the
international community recognizes domestic violence as a
form of discrimination against women, while our own justice
system ignores this reality.132
Although the international community recognizes that
the failure of the State to protect victims of domestic
violence is a form of discrimination and a deprivation of the
right to life, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence bars this
recognition.133 The Inter-American Commission focuses on
positive law and affirmative duties of the State to protect
victims, which has explicitly been rejected under the Due
Process Clause by the Supreme Court. 134 Additionally, the
Inter-American Commission recognizes domestic violence as
discrimination on women, but our Equal Protection Clause
case law makes it nearly impossible to prove that domestic

129

130
131

See id. at 1 170.
Id. at 160.
Id.

See id. at 163 ("The States' duties to protect and guarantee the rights of
domestic violence victims must also be implemented in practice ... States must
take into account that domestic violence is a problem that disproportionately
affects women, since they constitute a majority of the victims.").
133
See id. at 164.
134
See id.; DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
202 (1989).
132
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violence discriminates against women through the exacting
proof standards of discriminatory intent and purpose. 135
Even though some members of the Supreme Court will
not give credence to the Inter-American Commission's
decision, there are instances when the Court has considered
international law; the Court has occasionally considered the
international community's position on important human
rights issues such as the death penalty and the sentencing
of juveniles. 136 Justice Kennedy noted that the execution of
juvenile offenders violated international treaties (not
ratified by the United States) and that the international
consensus against that practice provided confirmation for
the Court's independent conclusion.1 37
Some may argue that the Court should not consider
international law at all, or that the Court will only look to
international norms for cases interpreting the Eighth
Amendment, because that is the context in which
international law has been applied recently.138 However,
the Supreme Court has considered international law as far
back as 1825 when Chief Justice Marshall held that the
American seizure of a Spanish slave ship violated the law of
nations.139 During the current era of globalization and
economic inter-dependence, the international community's
perspective on human rights should carry great weight in
the U.S. The Supreme Court needs to provide domestic
violence victims of police non-enforcement with some type of
meaningful remedy because it is embarrassing and

See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979); See also supra,
Sections I-II.
136
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (holding that the
execution of juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 130
S.Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (holding that the sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment).
137 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78.
138
See id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("More fundamentally, however, the
basic premise of the Court's argument-that American law should conform to the
laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of hand.").
139 See The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 83-84 (1825).
135
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unacceptable to have other nations give more weight to the
rights of our citizens than our High Court.

B. The SubstantiveDue ProcessArgument
Some may argue that victims of police non-enforcement
of restraining orders should seek redress under the
Substantive Due Process clause, for deprivation of life. 140
While in theory it seems to fit the domestic violence context
better than procedural due process, overruling Castle Rock
is more likely to have an immediate positive impact on
police non-enforcement
of restraining orders than
DeShaney. Castle Rock's facts are tailored to the unique
domestic violence context so reversal would not expand the
Due Process Clause's reach beyond addressing the need for
a meaningful federal remedy for domestic violence victims
of non-enforcement.
The enforcement of restraining orders will likely
increase faster with the reversal of Castle Rock. The Castle
Rock decision arose out of facts that were specific to the
issue of police non-enforcement, while the DeShaney
decision did not. This is important because holding that
civil protection orders may create a property interest would
have an instant impact on police enforcement of restraining
orders. If DeShaney were reversed, and the Court held that
states have the duty to protect individuals from private
violence, the relation and effect on restraining orders would
be more attenuated.

C. OverrulingCastle Rock
The Supreme Court should reverse Castle Rock to help
solve the national problem of police non-enforcement and
rectify the human rights violation. The CastleRock decision
effectively prohibits state legislatures from creating a
mandatory enforcement provision or entitlement to
protection because the Court held that even though the
140

See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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plain language of the statute required mandatory
enforcement, there in fact was no entitlement. 141 The
concurrence rejects the procedural due process argument as
"unconventional." 142 However, the nature and context of the
domestic violence epidemic calls for an unconventional
solution because the law has failed to provide justice for
victims who have paid for police indifference to protection
orders with their lives.
The doctrine of stare decisis makes persuading the
Supreme Court to overrule a decision a challenging
Beyond
undertaking, but it is not impossible.14 3
workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to
adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity
of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and
whether the decision was well reasoned.144 "Revisiting
precedent is particularly appropriate where departure
would not upset expectations, the precedent consists of
judge-made rule that was recently adopted to improve
operation of courts, and experience has pointed up
precedent's shortcomings."14 5
The Castle Rock decision should be overturned because
the decision is not well reasoned, it violates the Court's
precedent of deferring to federal courts on the application of
state law in their respective jurisdiction, and experience
points to the shortcomings of the precedent because the
decision proved to violate international human rights.146

Tritia L. Yuen, No Relief: Understandingthe Supreme Court'sDecision in
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales Through the Rights/Remedies Framework, 55
141

AM. U. L. REV. 1834, 1854-55 (2006).
142 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 770-71 (2005).
143 See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2641 (2011) (stating the
doctrine of staredecisis aims to ensure the goals of stability and predictability).
144
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884-85 (2010).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009).
See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998); Lenahan
(Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11, 160.
145
146
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The determination that a civil protection order does not
create a property interest should be overturned because the
rationale is not well reasoned. In order to have a property
interest in a government benefit, a person must have a
legitimate claim of entitlement. 147 Justice Scalia found that
the civil protection order is not a protected entitlement
because
government
officials
have
discretion
in
enforcement.148 The majority decided that the Colorado
Legislature's language that "a peace officer shall use every
reasonable means to enforce a restraining order" was not
mandatory because traditionally police officers have great
discretion. 149 This inappropriately disregards Colorado's
decision to eliminate traditional police discretion.o50 The
majority claims that the arrest statute is not really
mandatory because police still have discretion to enforce it,
while conceding that "in the specific context of domestic
violence, mandatory-arrest statutes have been found in
some State to be more mandatory than traditional
mandatory-arrest statutes."151
The holding is a clear violation of the Court's
"presumption of deference given to the view of a federal
court as to the law of a State within its jurisdiction" with no
justification for the abandonment of this principle other
than "we think deference inappropriate here."1 52
The
incoherence of the rationale behind the majority opinion in
Castle Rock warrants reexamination of the issue.
If a state wants to create an entitlement, it should be
free to do so. The majority states, "[i]f she was given a
statutory entitlement, we would expect to see some
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005).
149 Id.
at 759-60 (italics omitted, emphasis added), ("We do not believe that
these provisions of Colorado law truly made enforcement of restraining orders
mandatory. A well-established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted
with apparently mandatory arrest statutes." Id. at 760.).
150 Id. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147

148

151

Id. at 762-63.

152

Id. at 757 (citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998)).
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indication of that in the statute itself."153 This dictum could
create an incentive for a state desiring to create an
entitlement to do so by explicitly stating within a statute
that this protective order creates a statutory entitlement to
police enforcement which requires accordance with
procedural due process. A foreseeable case to reexamine the
procedural due process issue could be granted certiorari if a
state were to enact this explicit language and a police officer
fails to enforce a restraining order that results in another
tragedy.
CONCLUSION

The state and federal courts have been unwilling to relax
the strenuous standards of proof for equal protection and
state-created danger doctrine claims. Both claims do not fit
the unique context and problems inherent in domestic
violence and lower courts have been unwilling to make an
exception. As a result, there exists no federal civil remedy
for the women and children killed after the police fail to
enforce restraining orders.
The solution to garner police accountability lies in the
Due Process Clause and granting the states the ability to
fashion mandatory enforcement provisions that create
entitlements subject to procedural due process. To achieve
justice for the victims of domestic violence who are also
victims of purposeful police non-enforcement, Town of
CastleRock v. Gonzales should be reversed.

153

Id. at 765.

